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INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-GROUP HOSPITAL SERVICE 0RGANIZATION-
Plaintiff, a non-profit hospital service organization, furnished services to defend-
ant, a member of the organization injured in an automobile accident. Defendant 
thereafter entered into a settlement with the third party whose negligence had 
caused the accident and executed a release which included the hospital bill. 
Plaintiff then filed a bill in equity against defendant and the third party, claim-
ing that on common law principles of subrogation1 it was entitled to recover 
from defendant all sums received by the defendant in settlement for the hospital 
services and from the third party the cost of the hospital services made necessary 
by the latter's negligence. On appeal from a decree dismissing the bill of com-
plaint, held, affirmed. Where a party has assumed a primary obligation, the 
discharge of that obligation does not give rise to any right of subrogation. Such 
a right never follows an actual primary liability. Michigan Hospital Service v. 
Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W. (2d) 638 (1954). 
Considered as an abstract principle of law it would seem that the assertion 
that the right of subrogation never follows a primary liability is not open to 
dispute. For it would be true by definition that one whose liability is primary 
cannot recover against one whose liability, if any, is only secondary.2 The result 
in the present case, however, did not rest upon a finding that plaintiff's liability 
was primary as against the liability of the third party tortfeasor, but instead on 
the conclusion that, as between plaintiff and the injured party, plaintiff had by 
contract assumed a primary liability.3 It is submitted, however, that where 
"primary liability" is thus used to compare the liability of the subrogee with that 
of the person to whose rights he seeks to be substituted and not with that of the 
person against whom he seeks subrogation, a finding that the subrogee is pri-
marily liable should not prevent his recovery.4 Indeed, in the insurance cases it 
1 Had the contract between plaintiff and defendant contained a provision for subroga-
tion, such a provision would have been enforced. Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 339 
Mich. 574, 64 N.W. (2d) 713 (1954). 
2 As used in these subrogation cases, secondary liability means that the obligor is to be 
liable only in the event that the party having the primary liability fails to make payment. 
Where, therefore, the person primarily liable has made payment, the obligor's liability 
would be extinguished. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Thomas, (La. App. 1930) 129 
s. 556. 
3 Principal case at 373. 
4Tibbits v. Terrill, (Colo. App. 1914) 140 P. 936 (allowing subrogation of land 
grantee to interest of prior mortgagee even though grantee had assumed a primary obligation 
to pay such mortgage); Echer v. Echer, 216 Mich. 535, 185 N.W. 690 (1921) (surviving 
partner, though primarily liable for firm debts, subrogated to rights of creditors whose 
claims he paid). 
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is commonly held that the insurer is entitled to subrogation only where the 
contract is one of indemnity,5 and yet the prevailing view is that his liability to 
the insured is primary.6 It is, therefore, no answer to the problem raised in the 
present case to say that the plaintiff's liability was primary.7 The proper approach 
instead should be to determine whether those elements are present which have 
led the courts to allow subrogation in other cases. Pursuing this line of inquiry, 
it appears that, although the court expressly rejected the analogy of the group 
hospital service contract to indemnity insurance contracts, no significant distinc-
tion between the two can be made. As in the indemnity contracts, there is a 
risk of loss to a party upon the happening of a certain contingency, i.e., his 
hospitalization, and an assumption of that risk by the service organization in 
return for payment of a fixed premium.8 It has been held, it is true, that these 
group health associations are not insurers because their "primary purpose" is not 
risk distribution but the providing of contingent services at a reduced rate,9 but 
the reasoning which would justify this conclusion is not clear.10 The members 
do not pay according to the services they receive, only at a reduced rate, but 
instead pay a fixed premium, in return for which they may, upon the happening 
of a certain contingency, receive benefits not measured by the premiums they 
have paid. Certainly risk distribution, if not a "primary purpose," is a suffi-
ciently prominent feature of these contracts to provide analogy to the insurance 
cases. Moreover, the actual amount to be paid by the plaintiff association upon 
the happening of the contingency is not determined in advance by contract with 
its members, but by the cost of the services which become necessary. Plaintiff's 
obligation, therefore, is not, as in "investment contracts" such as life and acci-
dent insurance policies, a duty to pay a fixed sum upon the happening of the 
specified contingency,11 but is rather an obligation to "save the.assured whole" 
from loss due to hospitalization. It is, in other words, an obligation to indemnify, 
5 Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 N.Y. 37, 
147 N.E. 351 (1925); Domaus, "Subrogation-An Equitable Approach to the Problem of 
Imposing Payment Burden on the Wrongdoer," 13 0.KLA. B.A.J. 85 (March, 1942); but 
see U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas, note 2 supra. 
6 Moore v. Capital Nat. Bank of Lansing, 274 Mich. 56, 264 N.W. 288 (1936); 
Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J.L. 447, 171 A. 520 (1933). 
7 See, in this connection, 8 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 337 (1930). 
SVANCE, lNsURANCE, 3d ed., §10 (1951). See also McCarty v. King County Medical 
Service Corp., 26 Wash. (2d) 660, 175 P. (2d) 653 (1946). 
9 Jordan v. Group Health Assn., (D.C. Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 239. 
10 It has been suggested that in all of the cases holding group health associations not 
to be engaged in the insurance business, the courts were trying to take them out from under 
the regulation of general insurance laws which would make their existence impossible, and 
argument has been made that the better position would be that although they are "insurers" 
they were not intended to be regulated by the general insurance laws. 53 YALE L.J. 162 
(1943); 52 HAnv. L. REv. 809 (1939). 
11 Subrogation has been denied to life and accident insurers on the ground that their 
liability is determined in advance by the contract of the parties and therefore bears no nec-
essary relation to the damages actually suffered by the insured and inflicted by the wrong-
doer. Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Electric Railroad and Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 
633 (1908). 
486 MicmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
and plaintiff, having satisfied that obligation, should be entitled to the same 
right of subrogation given in other indemnity cases.12 The very nature of an 
indemnity agreement is that the assured, in the event of a loss within the terms 
of that agreement, shall be entitled to full indemnity but never to anything 
more than full indemnity.13 Applying this to the principal case, the injured 
party, having been fully compensated by the plaintiff for his hospitalization, 
should not be able to recover again from the wrongdoer. Since he contracted 
only for indemnity, allowing him to so recover has the effect of providing him 
with a profit from his injury at the expense of premiums paid by the other 
members.14 It would appear, then, that the better result on the facts of the 
principal case would be to allow subrogation, both to place the burden of pay-
ment upon him whose negligence caused the loss and to prevent the "unjust 
enrichment" of the injured party.15 
Douglas Peck 
12 See Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., note 5 supra. 
13 V ANCB, lNsURANCB, 3d ed., 789-790 (1951). 
14 See the discussion of this point in Moeller v. Associated Hospital Service of Capital 
District, 304 N.Y. 73, 106 N.E. (2d) 16 (1952), a case involving facts somewhat·different 
from those of the principal case. 
15 The doctrine of subrogation is a device designed to place the burden of satisfying 
an obligation upon the party who ought "in equity and good conscience" to make payment, 
and its application is proper "in all cases where injustice would follow its denial." Stroh 
v. O'Hearn, 176 Mich. 164 at 177, 142 N.W. 865 (1913). 
